a brief general overview. The focus then turns to the legal framework itself. As is explained, agencies are not foreseen in primary law nor is there any case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) specifically dealing with the institutional position of the agencies.
As noted, it is this hiatus that numerous authors but also the European Commission have tried to remedy by referring to the Meroni judgment. In its ruling, dating from 1958, the CJEU ruled out the possibility for the High Authority to delegate discretionary powers to bodies established under private law. 2 The main thrust of this article is the twofold assertion that the facts and context of the Meroni case stand in the way of a simple transposition of the ruling to the functioning of the current day agencies and that a mis-reading of the Court's judgment is at the root of much of the contemporary literature on agencies. Lastly, the challenges of agencification were also noticed by the Union institutions, which are currently discussing a framework for the agencies, after the Commission's withdrawal of its initial proposal for a draft interinstitutional agreement for such a framework. Therefore, in a third and final part, Communication on the operating framework for regulatory agencies, the Commission notes that the various agencies have certain formal characteristics in common: they were all created by regulation, have legal personality and have a certain degree of organisational and financial autonomy. 3 In its draft interinstitutional agreement on the operating framework for
The last type is the true 'regulatory' or rule-making agency holding discretionary power to translate broad legislative guidelines into concrete instruments.
Most of the EU regulatory agencies belong to the first and second category. The most interesting EU agencies fall into the third category, whereas the Union legislator has not (yet) founded agencies that can truly be categorized as regulatory agencies.
D. THE POLITICS OF ESTABLISHING AGENCIES
Chiti notes that despite the many differences between the various establishing regulations, the agencification process has consolidated a more or less uniform organizational framework. He sees this uniformity in the way all European agencies have a double purpose: not only do they institutionalize co-operation and integration among the Member States' administrations and between the latter and the Commission; they also give a number of EU policy fields a certain decentralized order, in the centre of which we find a body that is external to the Commission, but nonetheless partly subject to its influence. 21 The notion of agencies as a form of decentralized governance is frequently made, also by the Commission, 22 but as Scott points out, 23 there is hardly anything decentralized about the agencies apart from the fact that they are not geographically located in Brussels. This is quite clear when tracing the origin of the powers entrusted to the agencies. Most of these powers are not delegated by the Commission or any other EU institution but were previously exercised at the national level. Therefore, agencification actually comes down to centralization. 21 Chiti, 'An important part of the EU's institutional machinery: features, problems and perspectives of European agencies ', 46 Common Market Law Review 5 (2009 ), p. 1396 -1398 Communication from the Commission, The operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies, COM (2002) especially important, since it was and will remain responsible for making any proposals to establish new agencies. Keleman's narration on the establishment of the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) is quite revealing in this regard. 24 The Commission's basic principle is the continuous aggrandizement of powers at the European level, in other words, a
Europeanization of powers. This is preferably accomplished 'in house', through the aggrandizement of the Commission's powers. In general the Member States are reluctant to
give new and more powers to the Commission. Therefore, if further integration cannot be achieved in the Commission's preferred way, it opts for a further Europeanization of powers through the establishment of agencies. Here is where the game of forces, alluded to by Chiti, unfolds further. 25 The Member States are much more enthusiastic about giving powers to an agency than to the Commission: not only do they have representatives in the Boards of the agencies, the Boards also play a vital role in the appointment of the presidents of the agencies.
Agencies are also geographically dispersed, meaning the seat of an agency is an attractive trophy to national leaders and therefore often the subject of lengthy negotiation.
26
24 Keleman explains how the development of the EU's competence in food safety has been tied to the BSE crisis. When the BSE crisis first broke out in the beginning of the 1990s in the UK, the Commission seized the opportunity to expand its regulatory capacity by establishing the Office of Veterinary and Phytosanitary Inspection and Control (OVPIC) in DG Agriculture. By 1995 this office faced human and financial resources problems. The Commission proposed to transform the office into an independent agency, so that adequate resources could be allocated. When the BSE crisis truly exploded in 1996, this created a window of opportunity for the Commission. Backed up by the European Parliament, the Commission proposed an internal reform expanding the OVPIC, withdrawing its proposal to create an agency. The idea behind this turnaround was that only the Commission itself would be a sufficient guarantee for independence, whereas an agency would be too vulnerable to 'capture' by the Member States. However, in 1999 corruption scandals put the Santer Commission under serious pressure, ultimately forcing it to resign. This closed the Commission's window of opportunity again: the Commission was no longer a guarantee for sound, independent policy. In 2000 the Commission again presented a proposal for a regulation establishing a food safety agency. States in the Council, the Commission and, in recent years, the European Parliament. The ad hoc way of creating agencies and the political struggle during the decision-making process have resulted in the plethora of agencies, the internal organization of which, although built on a typical three part structure, 29 is never the same for any two different agencies. More concretely, the representation in the boards and the selection and nomination of the director are major subjects of debate in the decision-making leading to the establishment of an agency, the outcome of which greatly determines the influence of the respective principals over the newly established agency.
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Therefore, when Chiti speaks of 'a rather uniform organizational framework' 31 this must be understood as referring to the political reality in the relationship of the agencies with the Treaty Institutions and the national administrations, a reality that seems to confirm the neofunctionalist theory of power games between the Commission and the Member States.
Nevertheless, a uniform legal framework is missing; hence the Commission's proposals to establish one (see infra). These proposals also entailed a uniformization of the internal organization of the agencies. §3. THE MERONI RULING One of the main subjects of debate on agencies is the possibility of delegating powers to them.
Is there any possibility to create these institutions and transfer powers to them? Most authors look to the ancient Meroni ruling of the Court of Justice to find an answer to this question.
In the Meroni case, the applicant company challenged the way the High Authority had organized the financial arrangements of the ferrous scrap regime. the Meroni doctrine to the EC Treaty it also broadened the scope of the doctrine. The latter is generally overlooked by legal authors but it is important to consider that the bodies to which powers were delegated in the Meroni case were bodies established under private law and which fell completely outside the Community structure. In Tralli and Alliance for Natural
Health the Court applied (parts of) the Meroni doctrine on the delegation of powers from one Treaty institution to another and to delegation wholly within a Treaty institution. These situations are of course totally different from a legal point of view compared to the facts of the case in Meroni.
B. MERONI AND THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
The Court itself however has not (yet) explicitly applied the Meroni doctrine to the functioning of the Union agencies. This has been done in academic writing following the example of Lenaerts. Yet the state of play of EU agencies has changed quite dramatically since 1993. The majority of the agencies postdate 1993 and some of these recent agencies have been endowed with far more extensive powers than were held by the agencies in 1993.
Nevertheless, a lot of legal authors apply the Meroni doctrine to the current agencies and try to reconcile the current state of play with the doctrine. The main obstacle identified in legal literature to the further development of EU agencies is the principle of institutional balance derived from the Meroni ruling. 37 Vos even states that the objection to agencies read into the the Treaty legislator has distributed powers among different institutions, these institutions need to exercise their powers with due regard for the powers of the other institutions. A delegation of discretionary powers to EU agencies would then upset this balance.
38
As stated, paying the necessary respect to the principle of institutional balance puts a serious restraint on further agencification. This is why different authors have also looked into different ways of reconciling current but also future agencification with the principle. This is not an easy task, as some of their more recent EU agencies hold considerable powers. So much so that it has led several authors to conclude that only lip service is being paid to the Meroni doctrine and that in reality some EU agencies already operate in clear contravention of that doctrine. 39 Vos argues that the institutional balance will not be upset so long as shifts of power are accompanied by reinforcing or re-balancing the existing institutions. She does not, however, elaborate on how to achieve this. Instead, she focuses more extensively on the need for a more modern view on administrative law. It is indeed the second of these observations that carries the most weight: there is an urgent and practical need for a modern administrative practice.
Although 'balance' is a dynamic concept, it is hard to come up with ways to 'rebalance' the institutional balance after a shift in power, especially because the concept itself incarnates a zero sum conception of power. Griller and Orator on the other hand, do suggest ways of adjusting the institutional balance after such a shift in power. 40 Their proposal is based largely on the strengthening of control mechanisms. These should secure the prerogatives of the legislature to take the political decisions and secure the position of the Commission as the main EU institution responsible for the implementation of EU law. Such control mechanisms would, according to Griller and Orator, enable the agencies to wield discretionary powers while keeping in step with the Meroni doctrine. Through these proposals, Griller and Orator try to address the issue of institutional balance, which they derive from the Meroni ruling.
Apart from the question of whether it is correct to do so, a question which will be addressed later, it is important to note that by concentrating on ways to resolve the issue of institutional balance, they have lost sight of an important affirmation of the Court in Meroni, namely that '[a] delegation of powers … which implies a wide margin of discretion … cannot be considered as compatible with the requirements of the Treaty.' 41 The Meroni doctrine thus simply precludes the possibility to delegate discretionary powers, which makes it hard to see how Griller and Orator, in their endeavour to apply the Meroni ruling to agencies and according at the same time discretionary powers to these agencies, can ever be successful.
Apart from this legal issue, there are some practical issues undermining their proposals. If more control mechanisms are to be created and more control given to the other institutions, these institutions would also need the necessary expertise to exercise de facto control. If not, the newly created control mechanisms would merely result in an empty de iure control. Ooik sees no possibility to delegate true discretionary powers to the agencies without a Treaty change enabling this. Also according to Van Ooik, an effective system of supervision and control could mitigate objections against a far-reaching delegation of powers, an option which has been explored by Griller and Orator (compare supra).
C. CURRENT AGENCY PRACTICE AND INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
Before discussing the issue of the institutional balance, it is important to take a closer look at the criticism that the Meroni doctrine is already violated in the current agency practice.
Indeed, assuming that the Meroni doctrine is applicable to the agencies, this would seem to be the case. The dominant line of reasoning in legal doctrine and the discourse of the Commission in its communications on agencies prescribe that for certain clearly specified one might qualify the EASA as a quasi regulatory agency. 46 What is more, the de iure, nonbinding nature of the certification specifications means that few legal remedies are available to the undertaking wishing to challenge these guidelines of the EASA. As is argued later, it is this kind of problem that was central to the Meroni ruling and doctrine.
Not only has agency practice already overstepped the limits set by the Meroni doctrine, the Court already seems to have endorsed this in its case law. In the Schräder case the applicant had applied to the CPVO for a Community plant variety right. 47 The CPVO rejected this application because of a lack of distinctiveness of the candidate variety and this decision was later endorsed by the CPVO's Board of Appeal. The applicant then brought an action before the General Court to have the rejection decision of the Board of Appeal annulled. In its ruling, before assessing the pleas of the applicant, the Court first determined the scope of its powers of judicial review. This is where there are a number of remarkable elements in the Court's assessment. First, the Court seems oblivious to the fact that it is dealing with a decision of the CPVO, an agency. Instead the Court notes the wide margin of discretion a Community authority enjoys whenever it has to make a complex assessment in the performance of its duties. This again shows that endowing an agency with a strict mandate does not exclude the possibility of the agency wielding discretionary powers while fulfilling that mandate. One could of course argue that, although the Court seems to grant a wide margin of discretion to the CPVO in the exercise of its duties, this wide margin of discretion is not the same as the exercise of discretionary powers, which is needed to reconcile the different objectives of the Treaty, as envisaged in the Meroni ruling. After all, as Schneider notes, distinction can be 46 In addition to the issuing of certification specifications, the EASA also assists the Commission in the implementation of the regulation by giving advice and preparing such implementation measures. Again, the Commission is de iure not bound by the advice of the EASA, but the information asymmetry is obviously in favour of the latter. Therefore the remark on the rubberstamping by the Commission of advice given by predecision making agencies may be made here as well. true regulatory agencies hold more extensive powers, which must of course be justified on other grounds. I argue that, even considering Craig's observation, the principle of institutional balance that is central to the debate on delegation of powers to EU agencies and which many authors derive from the Meroni ruling cannot be derived automatically from that ruling. The main objection to this is that the principle of institutional balance was introduced, elaborated and refined by the Court in its case law. The principle as it is construed today is not the same as it was construed in the time of the Meroni ruling. However, most authors apply the modern interpretation of the principle in their analyses of the Meroni ruling and its consequences for contemporary agencies. Important to note is that at the time of the Meroni ruling, the Court did not even use the concept of institutional balance, as this was introduced only years later.
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The Meroni judgment then only forms part of the different constituent elements of this principle as it evolved later in the case law of the Court. 53 It is not self-evident, therefore, to apply the principle in its evolved interpretation to make sense of the Meroni judgment, as Vos would have us do when she explicitly refers to the institutional balance as applied by the Court in the Chernobyl case of 1990. 54 Other authors do not explicitly refer to more recent case law on the institutional balance but do apply it implicitly.
The main objection to applying the modern interpretation of the principle of institutional balance is that in its evolution from 'balance of powers' in Meroni to the modern day 'institutional balance', a qualitative leap has occurred. As Jacqué points out, the principle of institutional balance and in Meroni the balance of powers was originally conceived as a substitute for the principle of the separation of powers of Montesquieu, the aim of which was Court safeguarded not only the decision making process envisaged by the Treaties but ultimately also the accompanying guarantees for private individuals. Jacqué observes that this protective aspect of the principle seems gradually to have been lost as other means of protection appeared. This radically changes the way the Meroni ruling ought to be interpreted, and, as is explained later, even more so for agencies specifically. To understand the underlying logic of the Meroni ruling, it is interesting to read the Opinion of Advocate General Roemer in the case. 56 The AG first remarks that in a modern constitutional state, two important conditions should apply to the delegation of powers to bodies under private law. In the first place, the delegation may only be done by law which accurately describes the content of the delegation and, in the next place, sufficient judicial protection against the acts of such organisations should be guaranteed. He then goes on to look at the specificity of the ECSC context and remarks that the Treaty does not explicitly provide for such delegation, neither does it prohibit it. What he foremost emphasizes is that, in the case of delegation, the regime of judicial protection as established by the Treaty should be upheld. This can be achieved, still according to AG Roemer, by equating the acts of these bodies with acts of the High Authority or by having the High Authority take the final decision.
The AG took a relaxed stance towards delegation and was foremost pre-occupied with the continued respect for the system of judicial protection. These are a number of issues that have received little or no attention in legal doctrine.
Although Griller and Orator claim Meroni remains good law, 62 it cannot simply be assumed to frame the process of agencification. In Meroni the Court ruled on a delegation to bodies established under private law, but the fact that the EU agencies are public bodies warrants a more generous stance towards delegation of powers to EU agencies. Furthermore it was not the institutional balance of the Chernobyl case (compare supra) but the concern for the Treaty's system of judicial protection that was central to the Court's reasoning in Meroni and if the Meroni ruling is to be a guide in the process of agencification, this general concern should be honoured. Lastly, from a practical point of view, to apply a strict and untailored reading of Meroni to the EU agencies makes no sense either as a number of EU agencies already dispose of discretionary powers. This is completely ignored by the European Commission in its proposal for an EU agency framework, as is shown in the following and final section. 
A. THE PROPOSED INTERINSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT
In its explanatory memorandum on its draft institutional agreement the Commission explains the need for a common framework: the lack of such a framework would result in an opaque situation, difficult for the public to understand and detrimental to legal certainty. 66 The
Commission then goes on to state the principles of good governance, according to which the proposed framework should be established. A re-read Meroni judgment would indeed have the Commission focus on the principles of transparency and (judicial) accountability. The
Commission, taking the principles of good governance as a starting point for its proposal, may also be interpreted in two ways: firstly, this is an obligation of result on the part of the Commission to ensure that its proposal fully achieves these principles; and it should be considered as the Commission's major motive for initiating this proposal. The above observation on the continuing establishment of agencies in the absence of a framework, already casts doubt on these premises.
Since the Commission's proposal stranded, it is not analyzed in detail here. Instead some main elements are considered. To begin with, the nature of an interinstitutional agreement, which at most may only bind the institutions that are party thereto, may in no way amend the agencies, rather than all agencies. According to the Commission, applying the framework to future and existing agencies would be too difficult. 67 As mentioned, this did not prevent the Commission and the Union legislature from establishing new agencies, to which the future framework would not apply, even after the Commission made its proposal for a framework.
The scope of the draft agreement was also limited to the future first pillar agencies, excluding the second and third pillar agencies. This distinction does no longer make much sense following the entry into effect of the Lisbon Treaty. As Curtin notes, a horizontal approach should be followed encompassing the entire EU administration and not just the former EC administration.
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As for the proposal itself, an impact assessment would precede the establishment of agencies.
It would include several factors and would inter alia apply the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. This is in response to a certain criticism of a number of agencies that are small or only have limited, supporting tasks: 69 is their establishment justified in the light of these principles given the high fixed costs of establishing an agency?
Furthermore, the Commission proposed to establish future agencies using the legal basis of the policy in which they would be active, rather than the then Article 308 EC (now Article The Commission also devoted special attention to those agencies with the most intense prerogatives: that is to say, those agencies that apply Union standards to specific cases and are therefore given the power to adopt individual decisions that are legally binding on third parties. This touches the contentious issue of which powers may and, more importantly, may not be conferred to agencies. The Commission, referring to the Meroni ruling, therefore clarified that the following powers could not be entrusted to agencies: the power to adopt general regulatory measures, the power to arbitrate in conflicts between public interests or exercise political discretion and those powers conferred on the Commission by the Treaty. As was explained before concerning the quasi-regulatory powers entrusted to the EASA, the limits which the Commission seeks to impose, referring to Meroni, have already been exceeded. Thus the Commission's proposal concerning a framework for future agencies was already outdated in terms of current practice on this matter. What is more, by withholding the exercise of political discretion from agencies, the Commission assumes a clear distinction between technical and political issues. In reality this distinction is not clear at all, as Griller and Orator also point out. 70 The criterion applied by the Commission is not just outdated, as it is doubtful whether there ever was a clear distinction between political and technical issues, but is probably also oversimplified. This is a serious shortcoming since the way this criterion is defined would determine which powers may or may not be entrusted to agencies. The Parliament took a co-operative but critical stance. It expressed its concern on the continual growth of agencies at the European level and rightly observed that the future framework should gradually be applied to existing agencies as well as future agencies.
However, in its resolution, the Parliament is completely oblivious to the constitutional issues concerned in the agencification process and more occupied with the extent of its control over the agencies. The Council was not very enthusiastic about the Commission's draft and, as a consequence, this is where the discussions foundered. The legal service of the Council doubted whether an interinstitutional agreement was the appropriate instrument for such a framework because it felt that the draft submitted by the Commission went beyond the establishment of arrangements for co-operation between the institutions. According to the Council, the legislature would be bound in the future by a procedure not laid down in the be clarity on the powers entrusted to these agencies and only by clarifying the limits that need to be respected in entrusting agencies with certain powers can there be a meaningful debate on the level of control and the type of control mechanisms that are necessary and appropriate.
Looking at the proposal and the preceding communications from the Commission, it is clear that the principles of good governance have influenced the philosophy of the Commission.
However, it is equally clear that this philosophy and the endeavours to apply it to the (future) agencies is not a simple deduction from these principles. The Commission is not only trying to gain more control over the agencies but also tries to codify certain, albeit vague, limits to the powers that may be entrusted to them so as to keep agencies in check. In reality, the Commission's proposal consists for a large part in codifying existing agency practice but fails to address certain fundamental issues concerning the agencies. The Parliament for its part seems primarily concerned with its own powers over the functioning of the agencies, whereas only the Council has pointed to the need to include the primordial question on the position of the agencies in the institutional architecture of the Union in the debate. Likewise it is the institutional balance that seems to be a major concern for the Treaty institutions, their contributions to the debate being inspired by institutional self-interest as each of them seeks to extend (or maintain) its influence over the agencies and strengthen its position vis-à-vis the other Treaty institutions. However, as was noted, the balance of powers in Meroni, which touches upon the general interest, is different from the institutional balance, which may be seen as a balance between institution-specific interests.
A re-reading of the Meroni judgment would shift the focus away from the uneasy dichotomy between executive and discretionary powers and would re-emphasize the balance of powers instead of the institutional balance. This would have twofold consequences for the Commission's proposal. For one it would mean the Commission would have to make a bigger effort in setting out the limits to the possible conferral of powers to agencies, as it would no longer be able to hide behind the too simplistic distinction between executive and discretionary powers. More thorough thought by the Commission would ultimately touch upon the question of the nature of agencies and their place in the institutional architecture of the Union, a question that was left untouched by the Commission in its proposal. Secondly it would emphasize, even more than is now the case, the need for transparency in the functioning of agencies and, because of a clarified delimitation of powers, the question of accountability of both Commission and agencies would be addressed in a more satisfactory way, contributing to the realization of the principles of good governance. §6. CONCLUSION
Although the Meroni ruling is often referred to in the debate on EU agencies, the relevance of Meroni for EU agencies should be researched more thoroughly. The question is not so much whether Meroni itself is good law but whether the many differences between the facts of the case and the context of Meroni and that of the current day EU agencies, can be so easily dismissed as is now being done. Additionally, whether it makes sense to apply what was originally the balance of powers of Meroni as the institutional balance of Chernobyl to the functioning of agencies is an important consideration.
It has been argued that the true relevance of the Meroni ruling for the current process of agencification is the concern of the Court to refer to the balance of powers: that the system of judicial protection offered by the Treaty should be upheld at all times. This is because the prerequisites of accountability in general should be upheld at all times, regardless of the delegator, delegatee or the form, content and scope of the delegation. The pre-requisite of accountability therefore supersedes the factual and contextual differences between Meroni and the current day agencies. However, this general accountability cannot be reduced to a purely judicial accountability, as expressed in Meroni, but also involves political accountability.
It is political accountability, more precisely political control, which so far has been central to the discussions at political level between Commission, Parliament and Council. Of those three, the Commission and the Parliament especially seem more concerned with their control over the agencies than with the constitutional positioning of the agencies while the former actually depends on latter. When the Commission refers to the Meroni ruling to interpret the position of the agencies, this seems foremost inspired by the desire of the Commission to stay 'on top' of the agencies. This is all the more apparent when the Commission tries to apply a strict reading of the Meroni doctrine on the future agencies, even though the functioning of the current agencies already is in contravention to such a strict reading. A re-reading of the Meroni judgment would help the Commission (re)focus the debate on those fundamental issues concerning agencification, that so far are too much neglected.
